

























through	 the	 lens	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 build	 a	 bridge	 between	 classical	
debates	and	the	contemporary	debate	on	protecting	socially	weaker	subjects	
and	meeting	their	needs	and	interests.	The	article	discusses	in	particular	the	




the	 international	 treatises	 and	 the	 European	 directives	 on	 trafficking	 in	
human	beings.	My	contention	 is	 that	 the	second	notion	of	vulnerability	can	
absorb	 the	 first	 one	 and	 represent	 a	 disruptive	 conceptual	 tool	 for	 dealing	
with	the	“Sophie’s	choice”	in	which	many	workers	are	today	entrapped.	
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Neste	 ensaio,	 tento	 reler	 as	 teorias	 clássicas	 do	 pensamento	 político	
moderno	 sob	 as	 lentes	 da	 vulnerabilidade	 e	 construir	 uma	 ponte	 entre	 os	





TJUE)	 relacionadas	 com	 as	 vítimas	 de	 crimes	 e	 requerentes	 de	 asilo.	 O	
segundo	é	reconstruído	com	base	nos	tratados	internacionais	e	nas	diretivas	
europeias	sobre	o	tráfico	de	seres	humanos.	Meu	argumento	é	que	a	segunda	
noção	 de	 vulnerabilidade	 pode	 absorver	 a	 primeira	 e	 representar	 uma	
ferramenta	conceitual	disruptiva	para	lidar	com	a	“escolha	de	Sofia”	em	que	
muitos	trabalhadores	estão	hoje	presos.	






primary	 engine	 of	 the	 Hobbesian	 mechanism:	 it	 is	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 “mutuall	 Relation	
between	Protection	and	Obedience”	(Hobbes,	1651,	p.	445).	Vulnerability	is	the	source	of	the	
Leviathan-state’s	 legitimacy:	 it	 is	 its	 ability	 to	 protect	 and	 guarantee	 physical	 security	 from	





vulnerability	 developed.	 The	modern	 state	was	 born	 by	 carving	 out	 a	 group	 of	 individuals,	
territorially	concentrated,	and	giving	them	its	protection.	Thanks	to	individuals’	awareness	of	
their	vulnerability,	the	Leviathan	state	bases	its	legitimacy	on	the	promise	to	protect	them.	If	
some	 individuals	 were	 invulnerable,	 they	 would	 have	 no	 reason	 to	 enter	 into	 the	 social	
contract	 and	 accept	 their	 subordination	 to	 Leviathan.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 Leviathan	were	
unable	to	protect	vulnerable	individuals,	the	object	of	the	hypothetical	contractual	synallagma	





If,	 from	Hobbes	onwards,	 individuals’	vulnerability	 is	 the	basis	of	political	obligation,	 the	
path	 that	 begins	 with	 Locke's	 theorization	 extends	 the	 range	 of	 vulnera	 from	 which	 the	




to	 be	 protected.	 For	 Locke	 (1690,	 §	 123,	 p.	 159),	 however,	 individuals	 stipulate	 the	 social	





inflict	 itself:	 this	 lays	 the	 foundations	 for	 the	division	of	powers	and	 the	 rule	of	 law.	On	 the	
other	hand,	the	shift	from	the	idea	that	the	vulnus,	from	which	the	government	must	protect,	
is	 only	 a	 physical	 wound	 (which	 can	 be	 inflicted	 by	 other	 individuals)	 to	 the	 idea	 that	
individuals	 can	be	harmed	even	by	 infringing	 their	 fundamental	 rights,	 opened	a	new	path.	
This	led,	since	the	end	of	World	War	II	but	more	fully	to	the	present	day,	to	maintain	that	the	
government	 must	 protect	 not	 only	 individuals’	 physicality	 but	 also	 their	 ‘dignity’,	 in	 the	
Kantian	meaning,	as	the	basis	of	a	large	and	expanding	basket	of	rights.	
While	 Locke’s	 theory	 was	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 classical	 liberal	 state,	 the	 ‘minimum	 state’	 –	
which,	in	so	far	as	it	protects	negative	liberty,	personal	safety	and	civil	liberties,	becomes	the	
‘night	watchman	state’	–,	it	laid	the	seed	to	broaden	the	scope	of	vulnerability	and,	therefore,	
of	the	protection	that	the	government	must	guarantee	in	order	to	 legitimize	 itself.	 It	opened	
the	path,	as	T.H.	Marshall	said,	to	the	welfare	state	or,	as	the	French	say,	making	its	link	with	
the	guarantees	of	the	pre-modern	providential	plan	clearer,	to	the	État	providence.	
Indeed	Marshall	 (1963,	p.	81),	 in	order	 to	 legitimize	 the	welfare	 state	 just	established	 in	
Britain	by	the	Labour	government,	created	the	‘progressive’	narrative	that	the	recognition	of	
civil	 rights	 changes	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 social	 consideration	 of	 individuals	 "from	 economic	
substance	to	personal	status".	According	to	the	English	sociologist	Lockean	citizenship,	albeit	
"partial",	i.e.	not	including	social	rights,	paved	the	way	for	overcoming	many	of	the	differences	
arising	 from	 class	 distinctions,	 by	 spreading	 the	 conviction	 of	 the	 substantial	 equality	 of	
individuals.	 More	 generally,	 it	 pushed	 towards	 a	 less	 formal	 conception	 of	 equality,	 a	
"conception	of	equal	social	worth,	not	merely	of	equal	natural	rights"	(Marshall,	1963,	p.	95).	
Thanks	to	the	success	of	this	new	conception,	Marshall	argues,	the	logic	that	the	recognition	of	
civil	 rights,	 giving	 each	 individual	 "the	 power	 to	 engage	 as	 an	 independent	 unit	 in	 the	
economic	 struggle",	 made	 it	 perfectly	 coherent	 "to	 deny	 to	 him	 social	 protection	 on	 the	
ground	that	he	was	equipped	with	the	means	to	protect	himself"	(Marshall,	1963,	p.	90),	in	the	
nineteenth	 century	 began	 to	 falter.	 The	 existence	 of	 a	 common	 status	 took	 on	 the	 role	 of	
"architect	of	 legitimate	social	 inequality"	 (Marshall,	1963,	p.	73).	Thus,	 in	 the	second	half	of	




together	 with	 the	 fundamental	 rights	 to	 be	 protected,	 a	 normative	 model	 of	 citizen	 or,	
perhaps,	more	generally,	of	‘subject’:	one	who	knows	(or	is	disciplined	to)	use	the	rights	that	
the	state	confers	on	him,	and	can	adapt	his	or	her	subjectivity,	or	at	 least	his	actions,	 to	 the	





of	 all,	 by	 creating	 the	 premises,	 at	 once	 epistemic/cognitive,	 moral	 and	 political,	 for	
developing	a	range	of	excluding	and/or	inferiorative	dualisms,	articulated	starting	from	those	
of	 responsible/irresponsible,	 capable/incapable	 (Santoro,	 2003).	 In	 the	 modern	 state,	 in	
order	to	make	individuals	‘governable’,	two	different	types	of	discourse	‘objectifying’	subjects	
are	developed.	On	the	one	hand,	 the	discourse	 that	shapes	 the	anthropological	model	of	 the	
individual	capable	of	pursuing	his	or	her	own	interests	rationally,	planning	his	or	her	own	life.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	discourse	that	gives	rise	to	the	anthropological	model	of	the	individual	
incapable	 of	 dealing	 on	 his	 or	 her	 own	 with	 problems	 such	 as	 health,	 hygiene,	 sexuality,	
education,	suffering	and	death.	The	first	discourse	makes	individuals’	security	dependent	on	
their	 having	 rights;	 it	 leaves	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 human	 beings	 in	 the	 background	 as	 the	
ultimate	 ground	 of	 the	 contractual	 synallagma.	 In	 the	 second	 discourse,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
security	is	guaranteed	by	what	Foucault	called	“biopolitics”	in	his	studies	of	the	late	1970s,	i.e.	
the	 ‘rationalization’	 by	 administrative	 agencies	 of	 the	 main	 problems	 affecting	 a	 state’s	
population.	This	type	of	discourse	‘builds’	a	whole	range	of	vulnerable	individuals	who	cannot	
have	their	security	guaranteed	through	civil	rights	and	need	the	intervention	of	state	agencies.	
The	 latter	 construct	 the	 identity	 of	 individuals	 as	 vulnerable,	 by	 defining	 the	 needs	 and	
interests	 they	 take	 charge	 of.	 The	 implicit	 assumption	 is	 that	 they	 intervene	 because	 those	
people	 do	 not	 know	 how	 to	 overcome	 those	 vulnerabilities	 on	 their	 own.	 In	 this	 second	
discourse,	 government	 protection	 does	 not	 rest	 on	 a	 unitary	 basis	 but	 follows	 divergent	
criteria	 that	 differentiate	 the	degrees	 of	 vulnerability	 of	 different	 people.	 The	 attribution	of	
social	 rights,	 contrary	 to	 Marshall's	 hopes/predictions,	 does	 not	 give	 rise	 to	 a	 unitary	
citizenship	status.	Rather,	it	marks	the	resurgence	of	different	statuses	within	the	order	of	the	
modern	 state.	 Thus,	 a	 key	 role	 is	 given	 not	 to	 ‘human	 dignity’	 but	 to	 the	 specific	 status	 of	
individuals.	
The	creation	of	different	statuses	based	on	different	degrees	of	vulnerability	and	therefore	
of	need	is	 intertwined	with	the	dichotomies	created	by	the	 ‘normative’	model	of	 the	citizen-
subject.	Remedies	for	specific	vulnerabilities	are	accompanied	by	the	stigmatization	of	those	
relying	on	social	rights	because	they	cannot	meet	 their	needs	and	guarantee	their	economic	
security	 through	 the	 freedom	 of	 contract	 that	 Locke	 had	 made	 a	 natural	 right.2	 The	
recognition	 of	 government	protection	 to	 the	 supposedly	weaker	 contracting	party,	 narrows	
the	room	normally	allowed	 to	people	who	use	contract	 to	pursue	 their	 interests	and	satisfy	
their	needs.	
As	 Marshall	 himself	 acknowledged,	 social	 rights	 arose	 in	 England	 not	 as	 universal	
citizenship	rights	vested	in	a	person	who	is	his	or	her	own	master,	as	was	the	case	with	civil	
rights,	 but	 as	 rights	 meant	 to	 compensate	 those	 excluded	 from	 citizenship,	 to	 protect	










illness,	or	special	vulnerabilities.	That	 law	“treated	the	claims	of	 the	poor,	not	as	an	 integral	
part	of	the	rights	of	the	citizen,	but	as	an	alternative	to	them	–	as	claims	which	could	be	met	





the	 citizen	 par	 excellence.	 And	 they	 did	 so	 out	 of	 respect	 for	 his	 status	 as	 a	
citizen,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 enforced	 protective	measures	 curtailed	 the	 civil	
right	 to	 conclude	 a	 free	 contract	 of	 employment.	 Protection	was	 confined	 to	
women	and	children,	and	champions	of	women’s	rights	were	quick	 to	detect	
the	 implied	 insult.	 Women	 were	 protected	 because	 they	 were	 not	 citizens.	
(Marshall,	1963,	p.	84)	
	
Thus,	 Marshall’s	 narrative	 shows	 how	 the	 model	 originating	 from	 Locke’s	 theorization	
gradually	raised	the	problem	of	the	‘individualization	of	vulnerability’.	The	latter	ceases	to	be	
a	characteristic	that	unites	all	people	in	a	similar	way,	as	it	was	in	Hobbes’s	treatment.	There	
began	 to	 emerge	 ‘particularly	 vulnerable’	 individuals	 and	 individuals	 who	 are	 at	 the	 same	
time	 ‘particularly	 vulnerable’	 and	 dangerous	 for	 the	 political	 order:	 from	 Parsons	 onwards	
they	were	defined	as	‘deviants’	(Santoro,	2003	and	2004).	They	are	first	of	all	those	who	are	
unable	 to	 self-discipline,	 who	 do	 not	 own	 any	 goods	 and	 do	 not	 even	 know	 how	 to	 own	
themselves:	 the	 poor,	 in	 turn	 divided	 into	 deserving	 and	 undeserving	 (i.e.	 undisciplined),	
women,	slaves	and	the	natives	of	the	new	world.	This	makes	room	for	the	distinction	between	
deserving	 poor,	 whose	 specific	 vulnerability	 is	 linked	 to	 supposedly	 objective	 individual	
conditions	 –	 age,	 illness,	 gender	 (where	 the	 male	 is	 strong	 and	 the	 female	 weak)	 –,	 and	
undeserving	poor	whose	inability	to	meet	basic	needs	through	the	freedom	of	contract	is	not	
considered	objective,	but	a	 ‘deviant’	choice.	The	stigmatization	of	 the	 latter,	as	an	enormous	






from	 the	 ‘workforce’	 and	 a	 delimited	 portion	 of	 the	 ‘human	 species’,	 is	 defined	 by	 state	
sovereignty:	it	is	the	policies	that	take	care	of	individuals	that	constitute	a	specific	population	




the	political	and	social	claims	of	 the	weaker	classes	have	 found	recognition	and	response:	 it	












an	 irresistible	 force	 that	 states	 need	 to	 accommodate,	 giving	 up	 the	 governance	 of	 the	
economy.	 An	 ideology	 has	 spread	 that	 the	 new	 world	 of	 nomadic	 capital,	 unhampered	 by	




in	 the	 market	 logic.	 The	 relationship	 between	 reason	 of	 state	 and	 the	 market	 has	 been	
reversed.	 Until	 yesterday,	 it	 was	 state	 reason	 that	 defined	 the	way	 the	market	 develops	 in	
order	to	ensure	state	power.	Today,	it	is	the	functioning	of	the	market	that	defines	the	limits	
within	which	state	reason	can	operate	in	order	to	ensure	the	power	of	the	state	itself.	Such	an	
inversion	 implies	 a	 deep	 change.	As	 long	 as	 the	market	 could	 develop	 through	 government	
interventions	 guided	 by	 the	 reason	 of	 state,	 its	 growth	 had	 been	made	 coincident	with	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 the	 population’s	 needs	 and	 interests	 were	 protected	 through	 the	 different	
techniques	of	government	 that	culminated	 in	 the	policies	of	 the	welfare	state.	The	power	of	
the	state	was	 linked	 to	 its	 capacity	 to	develop	policies	of	 inclusive	citizenship,	based	on	 the	
progressive	 widening	 of	 the	 population	 groups	 admitted	 to	 social	 rights	 and	 services,	
themselves	in	steady	growth.	
As	 soon	as	 the	market	becomes	 the	 frame	 for	 the	operation	of	 state	 reason,	 it	 no	 longer	







If,	 as	 Foucault	 (1994,	 p.	 39)	 holds,	 the	 reversal	 of	 the	 legitimizing	 relationship	 between	
market	and	politics	calls	into	question	“knowledge	itself,	the	form	of	knowledge,	the	‘subject-
object’	 norm”,	 knowledge	 “not	 in	 its	 true	 or	 false	 contents,	 but	 in	 its	 power-knowledge	
functions”,	that	of	vulnerability	appears	as	the	appropriate	language	to	reformulate	what	has	
been	swept	away	by	market	domination:	 “at	 the	beginning	of	 the	21st	century	vulnerability	
begins	to	be	conceived	as	an	opportunity,	having	a	transformative	potential”	(Zullo,	2020).	
At	a	time	when	we	have	completely	forgotten	the	lesson	of	Polanyi,	who	had	shown	us	how	
in	 the	 twentieth	 century	 totalitarianism	 was	 born,	 somehow	 democratically,	 out	 of	 states’	
Santoro	I	Vulnerability	between	political	theory	and	normative	texts	
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inability	 to	 protect	 individuals	 from	 the	 market,	 vulnerability	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 matrix	 of	 a	
language,	endowed	with	conditions	of	assertability,	capable	of	giving	voice	to	the	same	needs.	




welfare,	 the	 language	of	 vulnerability	 seems	 to	be	 the	 tool	 to	give	voice	 to	 individuals	who,	
because	 of	 their	 intrinsic	 weaknesses,	 are	 unable	 to	 meet	 their	 needs	 and	 pursue	 their	
interests	with	only	civil	rights,	to	stay	in	the	labour	market	with	only	the	freedom	to	contract.	
Vulnerability	 has	 become	 established	 in	 international	 institutional	 discourse	 and	
normative	 texts	 –	 particularly,	 as	 we	 shall	 see,	 in	 those	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 –	 as	 a	
connotation	 of	 individuals	 who	 for	 some	 objective	 reason	 find	 it	 difficult	 “to	 solve	 their	
problems	in	the	market”,	to	meet	their	needs	through	the	freedom	of	contract.	In	a	first	stage,	
the	 official	 international	 (Thywissen,	 2006)	 and	 European	 Union	 documents	 defined	
vulnerable	 individuals,	 respectively,	 as	 those	 exposed	 to	 environmental	 catastrophes	 and	
those	 who	 for	 personal	 characteristics	 need	 some	 specific	 protection.	 I	 believe	 that	 this	
objective	connotation	of	vulnerability	has	made	a	decisive	contribution	to	the	success	of	the	
concept:	 in	 these	 contexts	 and	 with	 this	 connotation	 it	 seems	 capable	 of	 confining	 the	
‘additional	 protection’	 to	 the	 deserving	 poor	 or	 rather,	 according	 to	 the	 new	 language,	 to	
deserving	fragile	persons.	
From	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 European	Union’s	 legislation,	 the	 ‘vulnerable	 persons’	 are	 those	
characterized	 by	 an	 accentuated	 fragility	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 general	 vulnerability	 of	 all	
human	beings	which,	as	said,	lies	at	the	foundation	of	the	creation	of	states	and	legal	systems	
(in	a	somewhat	mediated	way,	even	of	the	 legal	system	of	the	Union).	The	legitimacy	of	this	
notion	 is	 facilitated	by	 its	not	being	used	 in	normative	texts	devoted	to	drawing	the	 lines	of	
policies	 tackling	 social	 fragility	 or	 precariousness.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 used	 in	 a	 Hobbesian	way	 to	
indicate	those	deserving	special	protection	when	they	are	the	object	of	aggression,	crime	and	
persecution.	 In	 these	 contexts,	 (particular)	 vulnerability	 is	 a	 feature	 that	 makes	 certain	
individuals	more	exposed	to	the	aggression	dealt	with	in	the	normative	texts.	In	this	sense	the	
notion	 has	 an	 almost	 victimological	 connotation.	 The	 only	 small	 opening	 to	 the	 social	
dimension	 is	 that	 these	 normative	 texts	 assume	 that	 the	 same	 (particular)	 vulnerability,	
which	exposes	people	to	aggression,	also	makes	them	vulnerable	when	they	have	to	react	to	
the	offense	suffered.	This	passage	clarifies	that	vulnerability,	although	conceived	as	a	category	
of	 victimological	 origin,	 ends	 up	 affecting	 agency.	 In	 particular,	 vulnerability	 refers	 to	 that	
ability	 to	 organize	 one's	 life,	 even	 in	 adversity,	 which	 is	 the	 anthropological	 pivotal	




in	 an	 area	 prone	 to	 environmental	 catastrophes,	 or	 because	 of	 her	 inherent	 personal	




Especially	 when,	 as	 we	 shall	 see,	 alongside	 children,	 who	 are	 vulnerable	 by	 legal	 status,	
categories	 such	as	 the	dependent	 and	women	began	 to	 appear,	 it	 became	clear	 that,	 as	had	
happened	in	the	nineteenth	century	for	the	first	social	rights,	supportive	interventions	guided	
by	 this	 notion	 were	 addressed	 to	 individuals	 considered	 inferior	 to	 the	 rational	 and	




or	 less	 conscious	 and	 explicit	 way,	 the	 path	 of	 building	 a	 discursive	 paradigm	 capable	 of	
taking	up	the	broken	thread	of	the	narrative	on	welfare	by	universalizing	and	socializing	the	
notion	of	vulnerability.	
The	 American	 author	 argues	 within	 the	 paradigm	 of	 justice	 theories.	 She	 basically	
proposes	 a	 theory	 of	 justice	 that	 assumes	 vulnerability	 as	 the	 compass	 orienting	 public	
policies.	This	operation	 is	based	on	a	return	 to	Hobbes’s	original	 idea	 that	vulnerability	 is	a	
universal	 given	 (Fineman	 speaks	 of	 shared	 vulnerability),	 affecting	 every	 human	 being	 (I	
would	say	every	living	being,	but	the	problems	of	other	living	beings	for	Hobbes	did	not	pose	
political	 complications),	 and	 the	 declination	 of	 this	 awareness	 in	 the	 discourse	 on	 welfare	
state.	 Physical	 aggression	 is	 not	 the	 only	vulnus	 that	 can	be	brought	 to	 human	beings:	 they	
have,	and	develop,	many	needs	and	interests	whose	failed	satisfaction	 is	a	vulnus.	Resuming	
this	 discursive	 thread	 seems	 to	 be	 the	 idea	 behind	 the	 proposal	 to	 make	 vulnerability	 the	
cornerstone	 of	 a	 theory	 of	 the	 responsive	 state,	 which	 supports	 intervention	measures	 for	
anyone,	and	not	only	for	specific	(at	least)	implicitly	stigmatized	groups.	Fineman’s	theoretical	








autonomy	 and,	 ultimately,	 against	 the	 normative	 model	 of	 the	 subject-citizen	 which	 the	




as	 the	archetype	of	 the	vulnerable	 individual.	A	realistic	 conception	of	autonomy,	maintains	
Fineman,	cannot	but	start	 from	the	given	that	 it	 represents	a	relational	concept/quality	and	
not	a	solipsistic	characteristic:	her	autonomy	is	not	that	of	Stirner’s	Unique,	as	a	certain	liberal	
mythology	 would	 have	 it.	 We	 can	 only	 be	 autonomous	 thanks	 to	 institutions,	 policies	 and	




social	services,	aimed	at	enhancing	 individuals'	potential	 for	self-determination,4	as,	 I	would	
add,	the	history	of	the	welfare	state	has	shown.	This	is	the	framework	of	the	contrast	between	
embodied/embedded	vulnerability	(Fineman,	2017),	which	could	perhaps	be	developed	as	a	
contrast	 between	 two	 notions	 of	 autonomy:	 one	 built	 on	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 rational	 actor	




Marshall’s	 citizenship	 status,	 which,	 albeit	 in	 a	 different	 way,	 made	 social	 rights	 part	 of	 a	
heritage	available	to	all	(gradually	also	to	non-citizens).	Vulnerability	seems	to	emerge	as	the	
pivot	of	a	new	language	to	save	the	essence	of	the	welfare	state	discourse.	
This	 in	 itself	 would	 be	 no	 small	 achievement.	 However,	 I	 believe	 that	 the	 lexicon	 of	
vulnerability	 used	 in	 legal	 texts	 concerning	 human	 trafficking	 allows	 us	 to	 go	 beyond	 this	
achievement	and	problematize	power	relations	that	the	 language	of	the	welfare	state,	of	 the	
claim	of	social	rights,	did	not	allow	us	to	problematize.	In	order	to	argue	my	point,	I	will	shift	
focus	 from	the	use	of	 the	concept	of	vulnerability	 in	social	 theory	 to	what	 is	done	with	 it	 in	
normative	 texts.	 I	 refer	 in	 particular	 to	 the	 EU	 laws	 that	 have	 incorporated	 the	 notion	 of	






the	 Council	 Framework	 Decision	 of	 15	 March	 2001	 on	 the	 standing	 of	 victims	 in	 criminal	
proceedings	(2001/220/JHA).	Article	2	§	2	states	that	“each	Member	State	shall	ensure	that	
victims	 who	 are	 particularly	 vulnerable	 can	 benefit	 from	 specific	 treatment	 best	 suited	 to	
their	circumstances”.	After	a	provision	requiring	special	precautions	for	the	hearing	of	"most	
vulnerable"	 victims	 (Art.	 8	 §	 4),	 the	 Framework	Decision	 contains	 a	 provision	 (Art.	 14	 §	 1)	
that	 outlines	 these	 persons	 as	 deserving	 specific	 support	 measures:	 “1.	 Through	 its	 public	
services	 or	 by	 funding	 victim	 support	 organisations,	 each	 Member	 State	 shall	 encourage	
initiatives	enabling	personnel	involved	in	proceedings	or	otherwise	in	contact	with	victims	to	




                                                










is	 equated	with	 the	 risk	 of	 re-victimisation6	 as	well	 as	 secondary	 victimisation.	However,	 it	
should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 in	 the	 Pupino	 judgment,	 still	 based	 on	 the	




vulnerability	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 Articles	 2(2)	 and	 8(4)”,	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 “whether	 a	
victim’s	 minority	 is	 as	 a	 general	 rule	 sufficient	 to	 classify	 such	 a	 victim	 as	 particularly	
vulnerable	within	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 Framework	Decision”	 and	 answers	 in	 the	 affirmative,	
arguing	that	children	“are	suitable	for	such	classification	having	regard	in	particular	to	their	
age	and	to	the	nature	and	consequences	of	the	offences	of	which	they	consider	themselves	to	
have	 been	 victims,	 with	 a	 view	 to	 benefiting	 from	 the	 specific	 protection	 required	 by	 the	
provisions	of	the	Framework	Decision”.7	
Italian	legislators,	when	transposing	the	Directive,	did	not	follow	the	strictly	victimological	
connotation	of	 “particularly	vulnerable	victims”	set	out	 in	 the	 text,	but	adopted,	 in	 line	with	
the	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 one	 focused	 primarily	 on	 inherently	 personal	 characteristics.	 Art.	 90-
quater	of	the	Criminal	Code,	entitled	“Condition	of	particular	vulnerability”,	reads	in	fact:	“the	
condition	of	particular	vulnerability	of	the	offended	person	is	inferred,	besides	from	age	and	






of	 Justice.	 The	 Directive	 decisively	 embraced	 the	 inherently	 personal	 connotation	 of	
vulnerability	by	requiring,	 in	 its	Article	17,	Member	States	 to	“take	 into	account	 the	specific	
situation	 of	 vulnerable	 persons	 such	 as	 minors,	 unaccompanied	 minors,	 disabled	 people,	
elderly	people,	pregnant	women,	 single	parents	with	minor	 children	and	persons	who	have	
been	 subjected	 to	 torture,	 rape	 or	 other	 serious	 forms	 of	 psychological,	 physical	 or	 sexual	
violence”.	
                                                
6	Directive	2012/29/EU	establishing	minimum	 standards	 on	 the	 rights,	 support	 and	protection	of	 victims	of	 crime,	 and	 replacing	
Council	 Framework	 Decision	 2001/220/JHA	 recital	 38:	 “Persons	 who	 are	 particularly	 vulnerable	 or	 who	 find	 themselves	 in	
situations	that	expose	them	to	a	particularly	high	risk	of	harm,	such	as	persons	subjected	to	repeat	violence	in	close	relationships,	
victims	of	 gender-based	violence,	 or	persons	who	 fall	 victim	 to	other	 types	of	 crime	 in	 a	Member	State	of	which	 they	are	not	
nationals	or	residents,	should	be	provided	with	specialist	support	and	legal	protection”.	Cf.	Amalfitano	2018	16.	This	is	not	the	
place	to	discuss	the	recital’s	definition.	I	shall	simply	highlight	one	element:	the	categories	that	emerge	as	vulnerable,	beyond	the	
politically	 correct	 and	 non-discriminatory	 language,	 are	 identified,	 explicitly,	 in	 foreigners	 and,	 through	 circumlocution,	 in	





The	 ‘inherently	personal’	 connotation	of	 the	 condition	of	 vulnerability	 is	 proposed	 again	
one	 year	 later	 by	 Directive	 2004/83/EC,	 the	 so-called	 “Qualification	 Directive”,8	 which	 in	
Article	 20(3)	 calls	 on	 the	Member	 States	 to	 take	 the	 same	 categories	 of	 persons	 defined	 as	
“vulnerable”	into	account.	Whereas	the	parallel	“Procedures	Directive”9	of	the	following	year,	
in	recital	14,	explicitly	identifies	only	unaccompanied	minors	as	vulnerable.	
Reaffirming	 the	 inherently	 personal	 connotation	 of	 vulnerable	 persons,	 Directive	
2011/95/EU,10	which	recasts	the	“Qualification	Directive”	of	seven	years	earlier,	extends	the	
categories	of	vulnerable	persons	covered	by	 it	 to	 include	“victims	of	human	trafficking”	and	
“persons	with	 serious	 illnesses,	persons	with	mental	disorders”	 (Article	20).	The	 inherently	
personal	 conception	 of	 vulnerability	 and	 this	 extension	 are	 reaffirmed	 two	 years	 later	 by	
Directive	2013/33/EU	which	recasts	that	of	ten	years	earlier	on	reception	(Article	21).	
Whereas	the	inclusion	of	people	with	illnesses	and	mental	disorders	among	the	vulnerable	




personal’	 conception	 of	 vulnerability.	 In	 other	 words,	 before	 the	 inherently	 personal	
conception	of	vulnerability	began	to	appear,	and	was	consolidated,	in	European	legislation,	an	






Article	3	of	 the	Protocol	 to	Prevent,	 Suppress	and	Punish	Trafficking	 in	Persons,	Especially	
Women	 and	 Children,	 supplementing	 the	 United	 Nations	 Convention	 against	 Transnational	






the	 giving	 or	 receiving	 of	 payments	 or	 benefits	 to	 achieve	 the	 consent	 of	 a	
person	 having	 control	 over	 another	 person,	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 exploitation.	
Exploitation	shall	include,	at	a	minimum,	the	exploitation	of	the	prostitution	of	
others	or	other	forms	of	sexual	exploitation,	forced	labour	or	services,	slavery	
or	 practices	 similar	 to	 slavery,	 servitude	 or	 the	 removal	 of	 organs	 (my	
emphasis).	











this	 definition	 only	 officially	 appeared	within	 the	United	Nations	 system	 in	 2006,	 following	
the	publication	of	the	interpretative	notes	and	preparatory	work.	Thus,	as	we	shall	see,	after	
the	definition	had	been	codified	by	the	Framework	Decision	2002/629/JHA	of	the	European	





The	 literature	 (Jansson,	 2015,	 p.	 83)	 stresses	 that	 the	 intentions	 of	 the	 drafters	 of	 the	
Protocol,	with	regard	to	the	abuse	of	the	victim’s	position	of	vulnerability,	are	unclear	and	that	
the	 concept	 was	 included	 in	 the	 definition	 of	 trafficking,	 apparently	 at	 the	 last	 minute,	 in	
October	 2000,	 at	 the	 session	 in	 which	 the	 formulation	 of	 Article	 2	 of	 the	 Protocol	 was	
completed.12	 Anne	 Gallagher,	 who	 participated	 in	 the	 process	 of	 drafting	 the	 Protocol,	 in	 a	
recent	 paper	 on	 the	 abuse	 of	 the	 position	 of	 vulnerability	 written	 with	 Marika	 McAdam	
(Gallagher,	McAdam,	 2018,	 p.	 187),	 reminds	 how	 this	wording	was	 introduced,	 on	 the	 one	
hand,	 because	 it	 seemed	 capable	 of	 encompassing	 the	 myriad	 means	 of	 coercion	 through	
which	people	are	forced	to	accept	exploitation.	On	the	other	hand,	it	appeared	to	be	the	point	
of	 balance	 to	 overcome	 the	 exhausting	 debate	 on	 trafficking	 for	 prostitution,	 leaving	 states	
free	to	regulate	the	phenomenon	internally	as	they	saw	fit.	
The	genealogy	of	 this	 second	motivation	makes	 it	 clear	 that	 the	central	problem	was	 the	
position	of	some	 feminist	movements	 that	 the	discourses	on	 trafficking	risked	 to	 favour	 the	
representation	 of	 women	 as	 a	 group	 of	 weak,	 inherently	 vulnerable	 subjects.	 This	was	 the	
logic,	which	we	saw	begin	 in	 the	nineteenth	century,	 that	additional	protections	are	needed	
for	individuals	unable	to	manage	their	lives	with	civil	rights	alone.	
The	 introduction	 of	 the	 abuse	 of	 a	 vulnerable	 situation	 and	 the	 irrelevance	 of	 the	
consensus	 obtained	 through	 it	 made	 a	 compromise	 possible	 between	 the	 abolitionist	
movements,	 who	 wanted	 to	 make	 prostitution	 illegal	 in	 itself,	 and	 the	 anti-abolitionist	
movements,	who	supported	the	legitimacy	of	the	free	choice	of	prostitution	and	claimed	the	
status	 of	 sex-workers	 for	 those	 who	 chose	 to	 practice	 it.	 The	 conflict	 stemmed	 from	 the	
Convention	 for	 the	 Suppression	 of	 the	 Traffic	 in	 Persons	 and	 of	 the	 Exploitation	 of	 the	
                                                
11	 UNODC,	 Travaux	 Préparatoires,	 A/55/383/Add.	 1,	 §	 63	 (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/travaux-
preparatoires.html).	
12	 The	 Travaux	 Préparatoires	 (A/AC.254/5/Add.19)	 show	 that	 its	 inclusion	 was	 proposed	 by	 Belgium,	 which	 suggested	 the	
following	wording:	 “abuse	 of	 the	 particular	 vulnerability	 of	 an	 alien	 due	 to	 that	 person’s	 illegal	 or	 precarious	 administrative	
status,	or	through	the	exercise	of	other	 forms	of	pressure	or	abuse	of	authority	such	that	the	person	has	no	real	or	acceptable	










Prostitution	 of	 Others13	 adopted	 by	 the	 United	 Nations	 in	 1949.	 The	 Convention	 seems	 to	
identify	prostitution	as	a	matter	of	international	regulation	whether	voluntary	or	forced	and	
regardless	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 transnational	 displacement	 of	 the	 prostitute.	 Making	 no	




the	 people	 involved,	 the	 Convention	 covers	 both	 female	 and	male	 prostitution.	Despite	 this	
attention,	it	is	perceived	as	stigmatizing	by	a	large	proportion	of	women’s	movements.	A	few	
years	before	 the	 signing	of	 the	Palermo	Protocol,	Radhika	Coomaraswamy,	 then	UN	Special	
Rapporteur	on	violence	against	women,	expressed	this	position	by	saying:	
	
The	 1949	 Convention	 has	 proved	 ineffective	 in	 protecting	 the	 rights	 of	
trafficked	women	and	combating	 trafficking.	The	Convention	does	not	 take	a	
human	 rights	 approach.	 It	 does	 not	 regard	 women	 as	 independent	 actors	
endowed	 with	 rights	 and	 reason;	 rather,	 the	 Convention	 views	 them	 as	
vulnerable	beings	in	need	of	protection	from	the	‘evils	of	prostitution’.14	
	
It	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 Convention	 on	 Prostitution	 resumed	 in	 the	







As	 argued	by	Gallagher	 (2010,	 p.	 16)	 and	many	 other	 feminist	 authors,	 “the	 new	 female	
migration	 of	 the	 early	 1990s	 was,	 in	 contrast	 with	 male	 migration,	 inevitably	 viewed	 in	
negative	terms,	with	little	thought	given	to	the	possibility	of	increased	autonomy	or	economic	
independence”.	The	reaction	to	the	migratory	movement	of	women,	which	certainly	also	had	
emancipatory	 connotations,	was	 the	 construction	of	 a	narrative	 focused	on	 the	 risks	of	 this	
phenomenon.	 Women	 were	 described	 as	 potential	 victims	 of	 trafficking	 and	 the	 object	 of	
criminal	 organizations.	 A	 representation	was	 born	 in	which	women	 and	 girls	 are	 forced	 to	
adapt	 to	 a	 condition	 of	 exploitation	by	 recruiters	 and	 criminal	 organizations,	 are	 victims	 of	
sexual	 exploitation	 and	 labour	 exploitation	 in	 the	 domestic	 field,	 are	 forced	 into	 false	
marriages	 or	 false	 adoptions.	 In	 this	 context,	 trafficking	 gradually	 acquired	 an	 autonomous	
                                                
13	UN,	Convention	for	the	Suppression	of	the	Traffic	in	Persons	and	of	the	Exploitation	of	the	Prostitution	of	Others,	1949,	adopted	
by	the	General	Assembly	of	 the	United	Nations	by	resolution	317	(IV)	of	2	December	1949,	opened	for	signature	on	21	March	
1950	 and	 entered	 into	 force	 on	 25	 July	 1951,	 available	 at	
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/TrafficInPersons.aspx.	The	Convention	was	 implemented	 in	 Italy	by	Act	
no.	1173	of	23	November	1966.		
14	 Report	 of	 the	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 violence	 against	 women,	 its	 causes	 and	 consequences,	 Ms.	 Radhika	 Coomaraswamy,	 on	
trafficking	in	women,	women’s	migration	and	violence	against	women,	submitted	in	accordance	with	Commission	on	Human	Rights	




place	within	 the	 problem	 of	 irregular	migration,	 being	 considered	 a	 phenomenon	 that,	 like	
“the	 white	 slave	 trade”	 a	 century	 before,	 concerned	 exclusively	 (apart	 from	 children,	 of	
course)	women.	
In	this	confrontation	the	battleground	is	not	so	much	domestic	work	as	prostitution,	where	
it	 is	 easier,	 as	 shown	by	 the	position	 recently	 taken	also	by	 the	 Italian	Constitutional	Court	
(Judgment	141/2019),	 to	argue	that	women,	 if	 they	were	really	 free,	would	never	choose	to	
prostitute	 themselves.	 This	 was	 the	 argument	 advocated	 in	 those	 years	 by	 the	 Coalition	






adult	 woman	 is	 able	 to	 consent	 to	 engage	 in	 an	 illicit	 activity	 (such	 as	
prostitution,	where	 this	 is	 illegal	 or	 illegal	 for	migrants).	 If	 no	one	 is	 forcing	
her	 to	 engage	 in	 such	 an	 activity,	 then	 trafficking	 does	 not	 exist.	 (…)	 The	
Protocol	should	distinguish	between	adults,	especially	women,	and	children.	It	





In	 such	 a	 framework,	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 abuse	 of	 a	 vulnerable	 situation	 seemed	 an	
acceptable	 compromise	 to	 both	 contenders.	 It	 did	 not	 require	 to	 classify	 prostitution	 as	
intrinsically	a	form	of	exploitation,	while	at	the	same	time	leaving	room	to	argue	that	 it	was	
always	 at	 least	 a	 consequence	 of	 a	 woman	 being	 in	 a	 vulnerable	 condition.	 In	 this	 way,	
signatory	states	were	free	to	choose	their	attitude	towards	prostitution.	
It	 is	 worth	 pointing	 out	 that	 this	 compromise	 was	 reached	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 codified	
distinction	between	smuggling,	to	which	a	special	protocol	parallel	to	that	on	trafficking	was	
devoted,	and	trafficking.	The	difference	between	the	two	phenomena	can	be	traced	back	to	the	
level	 of	 initiative	 and	 conscious	participation	 of	 the	migrant.	 In	 smuggling,	 the	migrant	 is	 a	
rational	 actor,	 a	 (male?)	 subject	 who	 collects	 information	 to	 make	 a	 choice	 about	 illegally	
undertaking	 the	migratory	 route	 and	 the	 organization	 to	 rely	 on	 for	 the	 journey	 (a	 choice	
between	criminal	organizations	but	still	a	choice).	In	trafficking,	the	migrant	(woman?)	does	
not	 make	 any	 choice:	 its	 resulting	 from	 “the	 use	 or	 threat	 of	 use”	 of	 methods	 capable	 of	




enter	 the	 foreign	 state	 illegally.	 Trafficking,	 instead,	 has	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 a	 contractual	













The	 vulnerability	 may	 be	 of	 any	 kind,	 whether	 physical,	 psychological,	
emotional,	 family-related,	 social	 or	 economic.	 The	 situation	 might,	 for	
example,	 involve	 insecurity	 or	 illegality	 of	 the	 victim’s	 administrative	 status,	
economic	dependence	or	fragile	health.	In	short,	the	situation	can	be	any	state	




The	vulnerability	of	 the	victim	could,	 therefore,	 be	due	 to	 a	 variety	of	 reasons,	 including	
lack	of	economic	opportunities	or	financial	difficulties	that	lead	to	consent	to	exploitation.	
However,	 the	 match	 between	 the	 two	 concepts	 of	 vulnerability	 was	 played	 out	 in	 the	




definition	 of	 inherently	 personal	 vulnerability	 and	 to	 speak	 of	 “vulnerable	 persons”,	 the	
Decision	 does	 not	 simply	 take	 up	 the	 Palermo	 Protocol’s	 definition	 of	 trafficking	 with	 its	
reference	to	the	“situation	of	vulnerability”	and	the	situational	conception	of	this.15	Since	the	
preparatory	work	 for	 the	 Palermo	 Protocol	 had	 not	 yet	 been	 published	 and	 the	 Council	 of	
Europe	Convention	had	not	yet	been	signed,	it	was	(practically16)	the	first	text	to	explain	what	
should	be	understood	by	a	position	of	vulnerability.	Above	all,	it	was	the	first	normative	text	







                                                
15	Article	1(1),	Decision	2002/629/JHA:	“Each	Member	State	shall	take	the	necessary	measures	to	ensure	that	the	following	acts	
are	punishable:	 the	recruitment,	 transportation,	 transfer,	harbouring,	 subsequent	reception	of	a	person,	 including	exchange	or	
transfer	of	control	over	that	person,	where:	(a)	use	is	made	of	coercion,	force	or	threat,	including	abduction,	or	(b)	use	is	made	of	
deceit	or	fraud,	or	(c)	there	is	an	abuse	of	authority	or	of	a	position	of	vulnerability,	which	is	such	that	the	person	has	no	real	and	
acceptable	 alternative	 but	 to	 submit	 to	 the	 abuse	 involved,	 or	 (d)	 payments	 or	 benefits	 are	 given	 or	 received	 to	 achieve	 the	











this	 choice	 could	 only	 create	 a	 conceptual	 short-circuit.	 In	 fact,	 the	 situational	 definition	 of	
vulnerability	 in	 the	 2002	 Decision	 is	 often	 overwhelmed	 by	 references	 to	 the	 inherently	
personal	concept.	The	first	reference	to	vulnerability	in	the	Decision	is	not	to	the	“vulnerable	
situation”,	but	to	the	“vulnerable	persons”.	Recital	3	explains	that	“trafficking	in	human	beings	
comprises	 serious	 violations	 of	 fundamental	 human	 rights	 and	 human	 dignity	 and	 involves	
ruthless	practices	such	as	the	abuse	and	deception	of	vulnerable	persons,	as	well	as	the	use	of	
violence,	threats,	debt	bondage	and	coercion”	(my	emphasis).	Recital	5	also	refers	to	a	concept	
of	 vulnerability	 linked	 to	 personal	 characteristics,	 stressing	 that	 “children	 are	 more	
vulnerable	and	are	therefore	at	greater	risk	of	falling	victim	to	trafficking”.	If	we	move	on	to	
the	 regulatory	 part	 of	 the	Decision,	 Article	 3(2)(b)	 provides	 for	 an	 increased	 penalty	when	
“the	 offence	 has	 been	 committed	 against	 a	 victim	 who	 was	 particularly	 vulnerable”,	 then	
Article	 7(2)	 defines	 children,	 correctly	 I	 would	 say,	 not	 vulnerable	 victims,	 as	 all	 human	
beings	 are,	 but	 “particularly	 vulnerable”.	 But	 Article	 3,	 betraying	 the	 back-thought	 that	
trafficking	 is	 committed	 exclusively	 for	 sexual	 purposes,	 states	 that	 “a	 victim	 shall	 be	
considered	to	have	been	particularly	vulnerable	at	least	when	the	victim	was	under	the	age	of	
sexual	majority	under	national	law	and	the	offence	has	been	committed	for	the	purpose	of	the	
exploitation	 of	 the	 prostitution	 of	 others	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 sexual	 exploitation,	 including	
pornography”.	 That	 is	 to	 say,	 in	 neutral	 terms:	 particularly	 vulnerable	 victims	 are,	 besides	
children,	women.	
In	conclusion,	the	Decision	contains	one	reference	to	situational	vulnerability,	when	it	has	
to	 define	 trafficking	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 Palermo	 Protocol	 (indeed,	 in	 this	 case,	 it	 is	 more	
royalist	than	the	king,	by	including	the	explanation	of	situational	vulnerability	in	a	provision	
rather	 than	 in	 a	 recital),	 and	 five	 references	 to	 the	 inherently	 personal	 conception	 of	






Of	 particular	 interest	 is	 how	 the	 two	 concepts	 of	 vulnerability	 are	 articulated	 by	 the	
aforementioned	 Directive	 2011/36/EU	 on	 preventing	 and	 combating	 trafficking	 in	 human	
beings	and	protecting	its	victims,	and	replacing	Council	Framework	Decision	2002/629/JHA.	
First,	it	is	worth	noting	an	antecedent:	in	June	2010	the	Council,	in	Justice	and	Home	Affairs	
(JHA)	 formation,17	 approved	 a	 “General	 approach”	 on	 the	 text	 presented	 by	 the	 European	
                                                
17	The	Council	of	the	European	Union	is	an	autonomous	legal	entity	but	meets	in	different	“formations”	depending	on	the	subject	






or	 disability.	 It	 should	 also	 be	 stressed	 that,	 when	 defining	 the	 condition	 of	 particular	
vulnerability,	 the	 Directive	 makes	 no	 reference	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 sexual	 maturity	 or	 the	
circumstance	that	trafficking	was	committed	for	the	purpose	of	sexual	exploitation.	




Like	 the	 Framework	Decision,	 the	 Directive	 provides	 for	 an	 increased	 penalty	when	 the	
offence	 is	 committed	against	a	 “particularly	vulnerable	victim”	 (recital	12),	and	Article	4	on	
penalties	specifies	that	the	concept	of	“particularly	vulnerable”	persons	“in	the	context	of	this	
Directive,	 shall	 include	 at	 least	 child	 victims”,	 without	 adding	 other	 categories.	 A	 careful	
reading	 reveals	 that	 minors	 are	 the	 only	 persons	 explicitly	 considered	 to	 be	 “particularly	
vulnerable”.	Recital	8	states	that	minors	are	a	more	vulnerable	category	than	adults	and	are	
therefore	 at	 greater	 risk	 of	 becoming	 victims	 of	 trafficking	 in	 human	beings,	 and	 recital	 12	
reiterates	 that	 “vulnerable	 persons	 should	 include	 at	 least	 all	 children”,	 again	 without	
mentioning	other	categories	of	persons.	
The	context	of	 the	Directive’s	development	and	 its	explicit	use	of	 the	 inherently	personal	
concept	of	vulnerability	 for	minors	only	suggest	 the	possible	absorption	of	 this	concept	 into	
the	situational	one.	One	glimpses	the	idea	that	some	personal	characteristics	of	the	trafficked	
person	 should	 be	 considered	 in	 themselves	 not	 as	 configuring	 a	 vulnerable	 person,	 but	 as	
factors	that	contribute,	under	certain	circumstances,	to	the	trafficked	person	perceiving	that	
he	or	she	has	no	other	option	than	to	submit	to	exploitation.	In	other	words,	by	digging	into	
the	 Directive,	 the	 idea	 can	 emerge	 that,	 if	 the	 position	 of	 vulnerability	 depends	 on	 the	
existence	 of	 objective	 situations,	 when	 determining	 whether	 the	 victim	 has	 a	 “real	 and	
acceptable	alternative”	 to	exploitation	his	or	her	subjective	condition	cannot	be	overlooked.	
The	 belief	 of	 having	 no	 other	 choice	 must	 be	 examined	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 not	 of	 an	
abstract	ideal	subject,	the	liberal	actor,	but	of	the	actual	trafficked	person,	taking	not	only	his	
or	 her	 extreme	 situations	 into	 account,	 but	 also	 his	 or	 her	 subjective	 conditions	 and	 socio-
cultural	background.	
The	 Directive	 does	 not	 go	 down	 this	 road	 decisively.	 It	 contains	 many	 statements	 that	
make	 the	 balance	 between	 the	 two	 concepts	 of	 vulnerability	 ambiguous.	 Recital	 12,	 for	
example,	 states	 that	 besides	 the	minor	 age	 "other	 factors	 that	 could	 be	 taken	 into	 account	
when	assessing	the	vulnerability	of	a	victim	include,	for	example,	gender,	pregnancy,	state	of	
health	and	disability”.	This	statement	sounds	different	from	the	definition	of	women,	pregnant	
women,	 sick	 and	 disabled	 people	 as	 inherently	 vulnerable,	 but	 it	 is	 certainly	 ambiguous.	
Ambiguous	 are	 also	Recitals	 22	 and	23	with	 reference	 to	minors	who,	 as	 said,	 are	 the	 only	
persons	defined	as	 inherently	vulnerable.	They	speak	respectively	of	minors	as	“particularly	








important	 when	 we	 stop	 seeing	 trafficking	 in	 human	 beings	 as	 a	 phenomenon	 consisting	








the	 situation	 created	 by	 the	 distribution	 of	wealth,	 the	 economic	 structure.	 This	 aspect	 has	
been	greatly	valued	by	the	ECtHR	in	the	Chowdury	case,20	which	has	separated	the	crime	of	
trafficking	 from	 those	 of	 enslavement	 and	 servitude,	 configuring	 it	 as	 a	 particular	 form	 of	
forced	labour	that	does	not	require	the	exploiter	to	play	an	active	role,	forcing	the	exploited	to	
submit	to	his	power	and	work.	
In	 its	 decision	 the	 Court	 reproaches	 the	 Greek	 judges,	 who	 had	 not	 condemned	 the	
exploiters,	for	having	“confused	servitude	with	human	trafficking	or	forced	labour	as	a	form	of	
exploitation	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 trafficking”	 (§	 99).	 The	 Greek	 judges	 had	 acquitted	 the	
defendants	of	 the	charge	of	 trafficking	 in	human	beings,	 finding	 “that	 the	workers	were	not	
absolutely	 unable	 to	 protect	 themselves	 and	 that	 their	 freedom	 of	 movement	 was	 not	
compromised,	on	 the	grounds	 that	 they	were	 free	 to	 leave	 their	work”.	The	ECtHR,	 instead,	
holds	 that	 “restriction	 of	 freedom	 of	 movement	 is	 not	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 a	 situation	 to	 be	
characterised	 as	 forced	 labour	 or	 even	 human	 trafficking.	 The	 relevant	 form	 of	 restriction	
relates	not	 to	 the	provision	of	 the	work	 itself	but	 rather	 to	 certain	aspects	of	 the	 life	of	 the	
victim”.	 The	 Court	 therefore	 maintains	 that	 the	 Greek	 judges	 have	 given	 “a	 narrow	
interpretation	of	the	concept	of	trafficking,	relying	on	elements	specific	to	servitude”	instead	
of	focusing	on	the	living	and	working	conditions	of	the	exploited	(§	123).	
The	Court’s	 judgment	 is	 not	 a	model	 of	 consistency	 and	 argumentative	 clarity	 (see	Asta,	
2018;	 Stoyanova,	 2018).	 The	 Court	 seems	 to	 be	 proceeding	 somewhat	 tentatively	 in	 a	 new	
direction	to	include	trafficking	in	a	provision,	Article	4	of	the	ECHR,	which	does	not	mention	it.	




                                                
19	 Already	 in	 2013	 the	 International	 Labour	 Organization	 estimated	 that	 between	 2002	 and	 2011	 20.9	 million	 people	 were	
victims	of	labour	exploitation	(ILO	2012,	13).	UNODC	data	show	that	this	number	has	certainly	risen	in	the	last	decade.	




any	 form	 of	 coercion,	 but	 can	 be	 practiced	 simply	 by	 taking	 advantage	 of	 the	 situation	 of	
vulnerability	of	the	exploited:	
	
The	 Court	 further	 considers	 that	 where	 an	 employer	 abuses	 his	 power	 or	
takes	advantage	of	 the	vulnerability	of	his	workers	 in	order	 to	 exploit	 them,	
they	 do	 not	 offer	 themselves	 for	work	 voluntarily.	 The	 prior	 consent	 of	 the	
victim	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	 exclude	 the	 characterisation	 of	 work	 as	 forced	
labour.	The	question	whether	an	individual	offers	himself	for	work	voluntarily	






are	 unacceptable.	 If	 someone	 accepts	 them,	 then	 someone	 else	 is	 abusing	 of	 his	 or	 her	






conception	 of	 vulnerability,	 which	 also	 takes	 in	 the	 problems	 arising	 from	 the	 personal	













on	 trafficking	 in	 human	 beings	 presented	 by	 the	 UNODC	 in	 2016	 (UNODC,	 2016,	 p.	 41)	
pointed	 out	 that	 most	 traffickers,	 in	 order	 to	 attract	 victims,	 exploit	 the	 element	 of	
vulnerability	 most	 often	 consisting	 of	 their	 socio-economic	 condition	 and	 their	 hope	 for	 a	
better	 life.	 From	 this	 observation,	 the	 Report	 comes	 to	 a	 conclusion	 that	 sounds	 like	 a	
condemnation	 of	 the	 Smithian	 approach	 and	 therefore	 of	 the	 logic	 that	 has	 governed	 the	






need	 of	 help,	 because	 they	 are	 objectively	 unable	 to	 stay	 in	 the	 labour	market,	 the	 ancient	
deserving	poor.	We	are	basically	back	to	the	starting	point,	to	Marshall’s	view	of	the	need	for	
an	“architect	of	legitimate	social	inequality”.	Marshall	was	aware	that	entitlement	to	civil	and	
political	 rights	 could	not	guarantee	 the	 substantive	equality	of	 citizens.	He	knew	 that	 social	
differences	“are	not	established	and	defined	by	the	laws	[…],	but	emerge	from	the	interplay	of	a	




autonomy,	 to	 realize	 one’s	 life	 project.	 It	 reminds	 us	 that,	 without	 substantial	 equality,	
contract	 is	 often	 an	 instrument	 of	 coercion	 and	 exploitation.	 These	 seemingly	 disruptive	
considerations	had	 in	 fact	already	been	made	a	century	ago	by	Max	Weber	 in	his	 insightful,	
and	not	surprisingly	forgotten,	analysis	of	contractual	freedom	(Santoro,	2008,	p.	29).	
Weber	 points	 out	 that	 liberalism,	 as	 we	 have	 said	 since	 Locke,	 tends	 to	 present	 the	
development	of	contractual	freedom	“as	signifying	a	decrease	of	constraint	and	an	increase	of	
individual	freedom”,	but	disputes	that	this	operation	“is	formally	correct”.	It	reminds	us	that	




“a	hitherto	entirely	powerless	person”	(Weber,	1954,	p.	167).	 It	 follows	 from	this	difference	
that	when	a	legal	system	recognizes	a	right	of	freedom,	its	effect	on	overall	freedom	in	a	given	
social	 context	 can	 be	 assessed.	 However,	 this	 automatism	 is	 not	 applicable	 in	 the	 case	 of	
contractual	 freedom:	 when	 the	 spaces	 of	 free	 bargaining	 are	 widened,	 one	 must	 carefully	
evaluate,	case	by	case,	"the	extent	to	which	this	trend	has	brought	about	an	actual	increase	of	
the	individual's	freedom	to	shape	the	condition	of	his	own	life	or	the	extent	to	which,	on	the	
contrary,	 life	 has	 become	more	 stereotyped	 in	 spite,	 or,	 perhaps,	 just	 because	 of	 this	 trend”	
(Weber,	 1954,	 p.	 189	 my	 emphasis).	 Weber	 points	 out,	 in	 fact,	 that,	 by	 committing	
fundamental	 spheres	 of	 people’s	 lives	 to	 free	 bargaining,	 there	 is	 a	 real	 risk	 of	 eroding	
significant	 spheres	 of	 freedom.	 Although	 the	 increase	 in	 contractual	 freedom	 and	 legal	
empowerments	may	 lead	 to	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 coercion,	 such	 a	 reduction	would	
only	 benefit	 those	 who	 are	 economically	 able	 to	 make	 use	 of	 these	 freedoms	 and	
empowerments	(cf.	Weber,	1954,	p.	190).	
It	 is	 no	 coincidence	 that	 at	 the	 origin	 of	 these	 reflections	 lie	 the	 dramatic	 conditions	 of	
early	 twentieth	 century	workers.	 It	 is	 these	 that	 lead	 the	 German	 sociologist	 to	 stress	 that	
freedom	of	contract	always	allows	“the	more	powerful	party	in	the	market,	i.e.,	normally	the	
employer,	 […]	 to	 set	 the	 terms,	 to	 offer	 the	 job	 ‘take	 it	 or	 leave	 it,’	 and,	 given	 the	 normally	
more	 pressing	 economic	 need	 of	 the	 worker,	 to	 impose	 his	 terms	 upon	 him”.	 The	 real	






its	 perverse	 effects	 “with	peculiar	 force”.	 Because,	 in	 fact,	 this	 sphere	 rules	 out	 all	 forms	of	
“authoritarian”	 intervention,	 “it	 is	 left	 to	 the	 ‘free’	 discretion	 of	 the	 parties	 to	 accept	 the	
conditions	imposed	by	those	who	are	economically	stronger	by	virtue	of	the	legal	guaranty	of	
their	property”	(Weber,	1954,	p.	189-90).	Since	Smith,	we	have	entrusted	the	satisfaction	of	
needs	 and	 the	 pursuit	 of	 interests	 to	 a	 method	 ultimately	 based,	 as	 Weber	 writes,	 on	 the	
coactus	voluit.	The	production	of	goods	and	services	works	also	because	workers	are	forced	to	
accept	any	working	conditions	offered	to	them,	regardless	of	the	humiliation,	marginalization	
and	exploitation	 that	 they	entail.	During	 the	 twentieth	century	 the	protection	of	 the	worker	
from	 the	 blackmail	 of	 necessity	 has	 been	 committed	 to	 collective	 bargaining	 and	 the	 strict	




compensatory	 element	 of	 contract	 and	 limit	 the	manoeuvring	margins	 it	 allows.	 Situational	
vulnerability,	 instead,	 enables	 us	 to	 change	 our	 perspective	 and	 see	 that	 we	 need	 to	
circumscribe	 the	 conditions	 of	 contractual	 freedom.	We	 need	 to	 prevent	 that	 the	 choice	 of	




expressed	 in	 a	 context	 in	which	 those	 responsible	 for	 ensuring	 the	 necessary	 conditions	 of	
free	 and	 responsible	decisions	 fully	 carry	out	 their	 task.	Only	when	 the	 choice	 to	 submit	 to	




choice	 to	 abandon	 their	 affections,	 their	 family,	 their	 children,	 to	 look	 for	 a	 job	 that	 allows	
those	who	stay	at	home	to	have	a	‘decent’	life,	to	“Sophie’s	choice”.	This	metaphor	refers	to	the	
protagonist	 of	 a	 famous	 novel	 (Styron,	 1976)	 (on	 which	 an	 even	 more	 famous	 film	 was	
based22)	 who,	 deported	 to	 Auschwitz	 together	 with	 her	 two	 children,	 a	 boy	 and	 a	 girl,	 on	
arrival	at	the	concentration	camp	was	forced	by	a	tormented	Nazi	officer	to	choose	which	of	
her	two	children	to	save,	and	decided	to	abandon	the	girl	to	death.	The	evocativeness	of	this	
metaphor	aptly	 illustrates	 the	choice	made	 in	a	condition	of	vulnerability,	a	 choice	between	
two	 goods	 (including	 legal	 ones)	 that	 we	 consider	 equally	 fundamental	 (in	 the	 case	 of	
exploitation,	 the	 dignity	 of	 work	 and	 the	 life,	 sometimes	 even	 of	 one's	 own	 family,	 earned	
from	that	work),	but	which	we	cannot	guarantee	at	the	same	time:	a	choice	that	no	one	should	
ever	be	in	a	position	to	make.	












Rivista	 italiana	 di	Medicina	 Legale	 (e	 del	 Diritto	 in	 campo	 sanitario),	2:525-551.	 Avaiable	 at	
www.iusexplorer.it.	
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